Kosovo’s Security Transition: A Critical Study into the Establishment of the Kosovo Security Force by Clewlow, Ade
Kosovo’s Security Transition
A Critical Study into the Establishment of the  
Kosovo Security Force
Ade Clewlow
N
orw
egian Institute of International A
ffairs
D
epartm
ent of Security and Conflict M
anagem
ent
Security in Practice 13 · 2010
[NUPI Report] 
Publisher: 
Copyright:
ISBN:
Visiting address:
Address:
Internet:
E-mail:
Fax:
Tel:
The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
© Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2010
978-82-7002-297-7
Any views expressed in this publication are those of the 
author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the 
views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
The text may not be printed in part or in full without the 
permission of the author.
C.J. Hambros plass 2 d
P.O. Box 8159 Dep. 
BO-0033 Oslo 
Norway
www.nupi.no
info@nupi.no
[+ 47] 22 36 21 82
[+ 47] 22 99 40 00
Ade Clewlow 
Lieutenant Colonel, MBE, Former KFOR Liaison Officer to the KPC
Kosovo’s Security Transition 
A Critical Study into the Establishment  
of the Kosovo Security Force
 
Pristina, Kosovo.  
Twelve months on, the statue commissioned to mark the 
declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, remained 
relevant for the Kosovo Security Force.

Context 
This is the second paper which analyses the transition in Kosovo’s security sec-
tor during the winter 2008/09 when the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) was de-
activated and the new Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was stood up. The first pa-
per, also published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, critically 
studied the de-activation of the KPC.1 The two activities were so connected that 
a second paper, studying the standing up of the KSF, was necessary to provide 
the reader with a full picture of what took place. 
 
Reporting to the Commander of Kosovo Force (COMKFOR) in Pristina, the UK 
liaison officer post existed to provide the eyes and ears for the NATO-led mis-
sion in Kosovo and to provide the essential linkage between the two organisa-
tions and other stakeholders at the highest level. The author spent 6 months em-
bedded with the KPC commander and deputy commander during the final 
months before the standing up of the KSF. The views expressed here are his own 
and do not in any way reflect UK or NATO positions. 
 
The author was a key member of the KPC leadership team that worked to de-
activate the KPC whilst simultaneously setting the conditions for the stand up of 
the KSF, under the direction and supervision of KFOR. The two events were in-
extricably linked; without a successful de-activation there would be considerable 
risk to the KSF project. As the first paper explained, the de-activation of the 
KPC was not as smooth a process as had been expected and this had a detrimen-
tal impact on the stand up of the KSF. Additional external pressures stemming 
from long-standing personal grievances, clan-based influence and political inter-
vention were also significant distractions. 
 
This paper has been written assuming some prior knowledge by the reader of the 
Kosovo situation although it is recommended to read the first paper in this series. 
Locked into the framework of NATO’s New Tasks2, this paper’s purpose is to 
critically analyse how Kosovo’s principal civil emergency organisation transi-
tioned into the newest uniformed organisation in the Balkans. The KSF concept 
though was not universally welcomed; Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic 
branded the KSF “an illegal paramilitary group” whose creation was “totally un-
acceptable”. Speaking on B92 television during a visit to Ljubljana in January 
2009, Jeremic said the “force is a direct threat to national security, peace and sta-
bility in the entire region”.3 
 
Language was a problem for many organisations. The word transition is used in 
this paper although a relationship between the KPC and the KSF did not exist for 
policy makers in NATO. In fact, the word transformation was banned by NATO 
                                                 
1  “The Kosovo Protection Corps: a critical study of its de-activation as a transition” dated 
21 Jan 10: 
http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Books-and-reports/2010/The-Kosovo-Protection-
Corps.-A-Critical-Study-of-its-De-activation-as-a-Transition 
2  The first task described the establishment of the new Ministry for the KSF (MKSF); the 
second task was focused on establishing the KSF and the third task directed the super-
vised dissolution of the KPC by KFOR. 
3  Google News, dated 21 Jan 2009:  
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hFUhM_dkT5VtQbsmvcICbBG
ZDF9Q 
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and KFOR staff in an attempt to create the impression of a new force uncon-
nected to the KPC. This policy was pursued to emphasize that, having completed 
its mission, the KPC was to be deactivated and a new multi-ethnic Security 
Force was to be created. However it is viewed though, the two organisations 
were inextricably linked by its people and it is this transition that is described 
here. And although concurrent work to establish the Ministry for the KSF 
(MKSF) was arguably integral to the creation of the KSF, only passing reference 
will be made to it here. 
 
The author had unique access to all aspects of planning for the KSF, and subse-
quently after it was stood up. The tensions that existed between the key stake-
holders often inhibited progress. At times, the paper is critical of the way that 
situations were handled or how they were allowed to unfold. The paper will in-
clude real examples to highlight these tensions. However, the paper has not been 
written to undermine organisations or to infer criticism of individuals, but to 
identify lessons that can be learned from this highly complicated process. Only 
the most flawed organisation will assume its performance to be flawless. 
 
This paper therefore aims to give the reader a balanced view of how the NATO-
led mission in Kosovo eventually stood up the Kosovo Security Force at one 
minute past midnight on 21 January 2009. It is hoped that lessons learned from 
Kosovo will help those engaged in planning security transitions in post conflict 
environments in the future.  
 
*** 
 
This report is part of the Norwegian engagement in the Multinational Experiment 
6 (MNE-6). The project is financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and is 
managed by the Chief of Defence through the Innovation, Network Capabilities 
and Information Infrastructure Command (INI). Besides NUPI, the Norwegian 
Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and the Defence Staff College are also 
engaged in the programme. Further information can be found at:  
http://mne.oslo.mil.no 
 
Introduction 
When the UN Secretary General wrote to the President of the Security 
Council in New York, Ban Ki Moon expressed his support for the re-
port by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s fu-
ture status, Martti Ahtisaari, with the following words, 
 
“Having taken into account the developments in the process de-
signed to determine Kosovo’s future status, I fully support both 
the recommendation made by my Special Envoy in his report on 
Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement.” 4 
 
For the NATO-led mission in Kosovo operating under UNSCR 12445 
Kosovo Force (KFOR), the published Ahtisaari Plan6 was the pre-
cursor for a small NATO team to begin to implement the obligations 
set out in the Settlement document. Describing the first of the three 
New Tasks, the Ahtisaari Plan stated, 
 
“A new professional and multiethnic Kosovo Security Force 
shall be established within one year after the end of the 120-day 
transition period envisaged in the Settlement. It shall have a 
maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members.” 
 
This would be administered by a civilian-led MKSF7 – the creation of 
which was another of the New Tasks (the third was KPC dissolution). 
The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Government of 
Kosovo on 17 February 2008 effectively set in train the detail con-
tained within the Settlement Document. The end of the 120 day transi-
tional period8 was followed by Kosovo’s Constitution coming into 
                                                 
4  Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, Martti 
Ahtisaari, dated 26 March 2007: http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf 
5  S/RES/1244 (1999), dated 10 June 1999:  
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement 
6  In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed Former Finnish President Martti 
Ahtisaari as his Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo.  
7  NATO is responsible for supervising and supporting the stand-up and training of a multi-
ethnic, professional and civilian controlled KSF. The ministry for the KSF is a civilian-led 
organization that exercises civilian control over the KSF. The minister for the KSF, 
through his ministry, exercises day-to-day responsibility for the KSF. NATO, dated 10 
Nov 10: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm 
8  That transition period should be used to accumulate statements of recognition of the 
conditionally independent state from as many governments as possible. ICG, dated 21 
Aug 07: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo/185-breaking-the-
kosovo-stalemate-europes-responsibility.aspx 
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effect on 15 Jun 08. This triggered a 12 month period in which to dis-
solve the KPC (and stand up the KSF). 
 
Preliminary NATO planning began in Joint Force Command Naples 
in late 2007 and was later transferred to a new organisation, the Mili-
tary Civilian Advisory Division (MCAD), under command of the 
KFOR Commander, co-located with KFOR HQ but in a separate 
building. This work was endorsed formally by the North Atlantic 
Council in June 2008. When the NATO Secretary General spoke to 
the media following that meeting,9 he confirmed that the KPC had to 
be dissolved by 15 June 2009 with the KSF stood up by the same date. 
The foundation for what was clearly a complicated series of tasks was 
hampered by the language used by the NATO SG during that press 
conference as the first paper summarised,10 “The IMP,11 in consulta-
tion with the ICR and Kosovo… [will]… supervise and support the 
stand up and training of a civilian-controlled Kosovo Security Force, 
KSF.” 12 
 
Even though KFOR was given the direction to implement this New 
Task, it was never fully supported by all contributing nations on the 
ground in Kosovo, which became apparent in their commitment to-
wards building a successful KSF. The New Tasks for KFOR was a 
problem from the start; a lack of resources to support the MCAD was 
unhelpful and KFOR’s focus on providing a “safe and secure envi-
ronment” in accordance with the extant NATO mandate ensured the 
New Tasks became an inconvenient distraction. The implications of 
UNSCR 1244 provided the political top cover for contributing nations 
to support the KPC; its trust fund, established by NATO to support a 
comprehensive resettlement programme for KPC personnel was fully 
supported by the International Community (IC). By contrast, the KSF 
struggled to gain international support and recognition, reflecting 
Kosovo’s political limbo; consequently the NATO Trust Fund estab-
lished for the KSF attracted little backing. Contributing countries 
seemed to be more willing to support the dissolution of a uniformed 
entity in the Balkans than to assist in the creation of a new security 
force. However, reflecting a real politik approach to Kosovo, some 
individual countries did make significant contributions to the KSF; 
unconstrained by Kosovo’s unique status, Germany gifted13 military 
                                                 
9    NATO Press Conference with Secretary General 12 June 2008: 
  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-3253B702-
5E536D28/natolive/opinions_7852.htm?selectedLocale=en   
10  Page 7, “The Kosovo Protection Corps: a critical study of its de-activation as a transition” 
11  KFOR was referred to as the International Military Presence in early UN documents.  
12  NATO Press Conference with Secretary General 12 June 2008:  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-3253B702-
5E536D28/natolive/opinions_7852.htm?selectedLocale=en   
13  The term “gifting” refers to the generic process of Governments giving military equip-
ment to (generally) emerging nations, either through purchases from third party manufac-
turers or existing military stock (e.g. the German and US contributions in this example). 
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vehicles and the US provided uniforms. However, even with weeks to 
go before the KSF was stood up, the KSF Trust Fund was millions of 
Euros short of its target amount. 
 
It is with this backdrop that the paper’s first chapter will scrutinise the 
plan that was adopted by the MCAD in order for the KSF to be stood 
up by 5 January 2009. It will study the Recruiting, Screening and Se-
lection (RSS) process to set the context for the remainder of the transi-
tion. It is important to understand what the implications of the time-
frame were; the pressure to meet the 5 January deadline was signifi-
cant for the small multi-national staff manning MCAD. 
 
The next chapter will continue to set the scene with the detail of how 
the internal recruiting plan was to be implemented. In broad terms the 
chapter will study the challenges that faced MCAD; focusing on the 
degree of coordination involved in implementing the plan. The paper 
will then turn to the political context. This chapter outlines the situa-
tion that developed when an unforeseen political intervention resulted 
in a delay to the COMKFOR-authorised timeline. This created a num-
ber of short term consequences for MCAD and the KPC senior leader-
ship, which will be explored later in the paper. The next two chapters 
will assess the build up to Announcement Day,14 known as A Day, 
and its aftermath, which will look closely at the fallout from the proc-
ess and consider why mistakes were made. 
 
Finally, the paper will bring together the key lessons that can be 
learned from the standing up of the KSF. The first paper found that 
there were three significant areas that could be highlighted for future 
transitions: the critical need for a robust communications plan; the 
need to understand the role played by culture within the country; and 
the precondition of clear lines of responsibility between all the main 
stakeholders, coupled with strong leadership. These issues were recur-
ring themes during the stand up of the KSF but there were also other 
fundamental examples of where events did not go as well as planned. 
The conclusion will serve to draw a line underneath the difficult, test-
ing but ultimately successful process of transitioning Kosovo’s secu-
rity architecture. 
                                                 
14  The day on which the KSF was created was called Announcement Day (A Day) when all 
successful applicants from the KPC would learn whether they had been selected for the 
KSF or not. 

Recruiting, screening and selection -- 
the plan 
The KSF was conceived as a lightly armed, multi ethnic, all volunteer 
force consisting of 2500 full time personnel with a reserve of 800. Al-
though it was to be a new organisation, the political and practical re-
alities determined that at least half of the KSF personnel would come 
initially from the KPC, which was approximately 2800 strong. The 
internal recruiting plan needed to identify the first tranche of approxi-
mately 1400 personnel, assuming they met the entry criteria. Kosovo-
wide recruitment would then commence on the day the KSF stood up, 
which would represent its “new blood”. This paper will only look at 
the internal recruiting activity. NATO’s team in Pristina, the MCAD, 
had to come up with a credible plan. After considering various options 
throughout 2008, the decision was finally taken in September to de-
activate the KPC at midnight on 4 January 2009 and stand up the KSF 
at one minute past midnight on 5 January 2009. This did not leave 
much time for what needed to be done. The plan was effectively split 
into three distinct phases. 
 
The first phase was to ensure all KPC personnel who met the criteria 
were given the opportunity to apply for service in the KSF. Teams 
from MCAD were to be dispatched to all KPC locations across the 
country over several weeks in order to assist personnel with this task. 
Based on information supplied by the KPC Personnel Department, the 
MCAD prepared all the necessary documentation. Having provided 
advanced warning of their schedule, teams would leave early every 
morning, together with interpreters, in order to process applications. 
 
The second phase was to invite all those who had applied to join the 
KSF to attend a “NATO standards”15 selection test at Ferizai. The 
term ”NATO Standards’ was used to reassure the IC, members of the 
KPC and the wider public, that these standards would be rigorously 
applied to selection and subsequent training. In reality, NATO had to 
be flexible over certain criteria (for example dental standards were 
never applied). Ferizaj was a KPC location 45 minutes south of Pris-
tina and had been identified as the location for future KSF training. 
The selection programme included an intelligence test, an interview in 
their own language (the range of applicants included all ethnic back-
                                                 
15  However the lack of a pro-active communications campaign ensured that inside Kosovo 
the phrase meant very little. 
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grounds including Kosovo Serbs) and a physical test involving a run, 
sit ups and press ups. 
 
Ferizaj would therefore host the Italian-led NATO Training Team re-
sponsible for KSF training courses. The plan envisaged that after re-
ceiving confirmation that they had been selected for the KSF, person-
nel had up to 6 weeks to agree to the terms of the contract offered to 
them. Then, dependent on capacity, all newly selected KSF personnel 
up to and including Lieutenant Colonel, would be temporarily re-
moved from their assigned post to attend a 4 week training course16. 
In preparation for this activity, extensive refurbishment had been tak-
ing place at Ferizaj, which included building a running track for the 
physical test. Unfortunately even with weeks to go before the first 
group were invited to undergo selection, there were problems with the 
infrastructure including a lack of fresh water and too few ablutions for 
the large numbers expected to spend the day on site. These issues, po-
tentially damaging for the image of the KSF, seemed to indicate a lack 
of urgency in putting all the essential pieces in place before starting 
the task of training future members of the force17. 
 
The third and final phase was the selection of personnel. The intricate 
plan set the selection board for the KSF Commander on the 7 Novem-
ber, the Senior Officers Advisory Board (SOSAB) to select full Colo-
nels and above on 24 November and the remaining selections for offi-
cers and other ranks to follow in a cascade fashion thereafter. All 
members of the KPC who had applied for the KSF were to receive no-
tification by envelope at one of 7 + 318 new ”KSF’ locations across the 
country on 12 December 2008 (A Day). 
 
The MCAD received results from the selection tests and also had on 
file the individual’s own application which outlined their preferences 
for future employment in the KSF (by specialisation) and their current 
role. This data was loaded into the Excel database and, using a points-
based system, each KPC applicant was placed in an order of merit 
ready for the pre-selection boards which were due to take place in 
MCAD’s headquarters. These pre-selection boards were designed to 
reduce the field of candidates to a manageable number before the 
main selection boards. The International Civilian Office (ICO) sent 
representatives to every session and was integral to the transparency 
and fairness of the selection procedure. The key to ensuring a meas-
                                                 
16  These courses were later run by national training teams from NATO countries under Ital-
ian direction. In parallel with the RSS planning, the training teams were busy writing their 
lesson plans and preparing for the basic training course. 
17  In fact, the decision was taken during the selection activity to move initial training to the 
Kosovo Police Training Centre at Vustri in the north, close to the unsettled and divided 
town of Mitrovice.  
18  The +3 was a reference to the need for short term additional capacity to consolidate 
equipment during for a period of months. 
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ured and logical selection process was to identify the commander of 
the KSF first, then select the senior officers followed by the remaining 
officers and other ranks. It is worth putting this process into context 
with other activity at that time: the de-activation of the KPC was in 
full swing; there was growing discontent over the issue of pensions 
and resettlement; KPC barracks were closing and equipment was be-
ing centralised; senior KPC officers were undergoing external training 
to prepare them for the rigours of organising the KSF (taking them 
away from their units); and all KPC personnel were being invited to 
attend selection tests in Ferizaj. It was a complicated and interdepend-
ent plan which left no room for the unexpected. 
 
One final element to the selection procedure fell under the “screening’ 
category. The decision was taken that the cost of putting every single 
KPC applicant through a medical (€50 per person) was prohibitively 
expensive and so only those provisionally selected from the pre-
selection boards would be sent to a pre-arranged medical in Obilic. 
Even this sensible control of finite resources generated unintended 
consequences for the credibility of the overall process. The medical 
reports were then sent to MCAD and a KFOR Doctor made a determi-
nation on whether the applicant was fit for service in the KSF based 
on the medical report from Obilic. There was initially some difficulty 
in finding a KFOR Doctor who would carry out this task because there 
was a requirement to make a judgement based on a third party assess-
ment. In fact two issues arose: firstly there was concern that some 
members of the KPC who had well documented poor medical condi-
tions were still receiving medical clearance; and secondly the general 
consensus was that an invitation for a medical was effectively accep-
tance into the KSF. This perception within the KPC was allowed to 
run unchecked by KFOR. Finally, after considerable debate, the deci-
sion was taken not to inform an individual if their non selection for the 
KSF was down to a medical “failure”. This judgement was highly 
contentious. In addition, the decision not to have a formal appeals 
procedure for unselected personnel, a decision based on finite re-
sources within MCAD, almost guaranteed that those who were not 
selected and who had taken a medical would feel aggrieved at not be-
ing told the reason for this decision. However, MCAD simply did not 
have the capacity to meet this anticipated need19. 
 
As the owner of the establishment of the KSF, what was missing was 
a KFOR-led, proactive communications plan describing the KSF stand 
up in the appropriate detail to the media. The Information Operations 
representative in KFOR lacked any real interest and rarely attended 
                                                 
19  In fact, the MCAD eventually agreed to a compromise; a telephone number was set up 
immediately after the selections were announced to answer general questions, although 
individuals were still not informed about medical results. 
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relevant meetings. Directed by NATO HQ to be reactive with the me-
dia, issues were misunderstood and poorly reported by the Kosovan 
press from KFOR’s perspective. In effect, the KPC membership and 
the newspapers drew their own conclusions. The medical issue was 
one example; the fact that KPC personnel were called forward for a 
medical assessment was not a guarantee of acceptance into the KSF, 
but this was the conclusion drawn by many of those involved. There 
was no countering this myth by KFOR. The national media also 
stirred up unwelcome feelings involving the conditions for resettle-
ment available to KPC personnel not selected for the KSF; in a coun-
try with 40% unemployment the message needed help, but none was 
forthcoming. In short, these major concerns over the stand down of 
the KPC and the stand up of the KSF were allowed to drift.  
 
Finally, one important detail to address was the security of the former 
7+3 KPC locations that would become KSF sites. They were full of 
equipment and vehicles which needed to be guarded between the pe-
riod when the KPC personnel were sent home and when they were due 
to return to work in the KSF; a matter of a few days to re-brand the 
KSF locations. Even the question of who would provide the guard was 
divisive. The KPC were firmly of the opinion that KFOR were best 
placed to act as a deterrent against criminals who may want to steal 
equipment or damage the barracks. The respect for KFOR by the 
population was likely to act as a deterrent in itself. However, KFOR 
saw the picture differently and insisted that, as third responders behind 
the Kosovo Police and the UN over criminal matters, it was not their 
responsibility. The KPC leadership could not understand this decision 
and to them the issue demonstrated KFOR’s reluctance to be involved 
with the KSF. Nevertheless, the KPC devised a plan to provide guards 
from within its ranks, supported with additional patrolling by the Kos-
ovo Police. 
Recruiting, screening and selection -- 
implementation 
The sheer volume of personnel expected to apply for the KSF from 
within the KPC, and the limited time available, resulted in the applica-
tion process and testing taking place concurrently. The daily visits to 
KPC locations across Kosovo were on the whole successful; the num-
bers involved were as high as expected and even though the KPC in 
some areas had all but ceased work, there was a feeling that the KPC 
had bought into the concept of the KSF. There was one example of 
dissatisfaction. The commander of a 25 man unit was opposed to the 
process and decided to make his feelings known by voicing his con-
cerns to a local newspaper, contravening the KPC Disciplinary Code. 
He also directed his men not to apply for the KSF. Although no action 
was taken against him, considerable effort was made to encourage his 
personnel to change their minds. After hours of personal meetings by 
a range of people, including a Government advisor, they finally agreed 
to put their names forward (with the commander’s blessing) and their 
applications were collected. It was late October and way beyond the 
final deadline for applications but the absence of this unit was impor-
tant to the integrity of the whole process. 
 
The decision was taken to use a range of relatively uncontroversial 
criteria during testing, reflecting the limited time available and to pro-
vide the NATO staff with a fairly straight forward and objective view 
of each candidate. There was a determination to ensure the selection 
procedure was scrupulously fair which in some cases resulted in too 
little recognition of cultural sensitivities; if anything the process 
lacked a degree of subjectivity. For example, some members of the 
KPC had received extended educational opportunities at United States 
Military facilities, their English was excellent and they were rightly 
confident of their own abilities. In many ways, these candidates were 
ideal for the KSF. In fact, they were denied the opportunity to conduct 
the interview at Ferizaj in English, and had to conduct the interviews 
through interpreters. The cultural aspect of this scenario can be seen 
from both sides and is important; the KFOR interviewer, working off 
a script, wanted to ensure the applicant did not receive an unfair ad-
vantage over non English speakers. However, by being so prescrip-
tive, the interviewer denied the candidates the opportunity to demon-
strate their skills and ability which, in cultural terms, is precisely what 
they would want to do (in order to provide them with an advantage). 
In some cases the candidate’s proficiency of English was higher than 
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the interviewer. There is a counter argument that if NATO standards 
had been applied rigidly, there would have been far fewer candidates 
who would have been eligible for the KSF. But the decision was taken 
to adapt to the circumstances; the point here is that it sometimes didn’t 
go far enough. Taking time to understand the cultural aspects of the 
population undergoing a transition is vital and, like in the first paper, 
remains an important lesson learned. 
 
Another incident involved the intelligence tests. Within days of the 
start of testing, the content of the papers being used in Ferizaj were in 
circulation around the KPC Protection Zones (PZ). The KPC person-
nel who had attended in the first couple of days recognised the tests as 
having been used in previous KFOR training. They were quickly pho-
tocopied and passed between potential candidates. The author was 
handed evidence of this on the second day of testing. Once the fact 
came to light the tests were replaced. The repercussions were mini-
mised because of the swift action taken by MCAD. The fact that the 
KPC leadership raised the problem was evidence of their willingness 
to do things right; this was based on their desire to meet “NATO stan-
dards” of behaviour. 
 
As results were accumulated in MCAD headquarters the challenge to 
place applicants in an order of merit, balancing their wishes against 
the needs of the KSF was difficult. With looming deadlines, and a 
constant ebb and flow of results from Ferizaj and from the medical 
board, managing the process became a risk in itself. The results were 
continually input onto a single database. In addition, there was a lack 
of subjectivity evident in the selection criteria. In a mature military 
organisation, annual reports provide evidence of performance, poten-
tial and offer an excellent tool for personnel management. The KPC’s 
early practice of writing annual reports on its personnel had become 
unreliable over the years. As a consequence there was no additional 
means against which to judge KSF applicants beyond the objective 
test results and the personal data contained in each candidate’s appli-
cation. A suggestion was made to ask PZ Commanders to write re-
ports on each of their personnel on one page, commenting on their 
suitability to join the KSF and highlighting any major reservations, 
such as bad attendance or a poor disciplinary record. And they were 
asked to do this against very tight deadlines. The idea did not initially 
go down well within MCAD. The feeling was that it would be too 
subjective and would present commanders with the opportunity to re-
move certain KPC personnel from the selection process. There was no 
denying this possibility but the absence of any input by the KPC 
commanders was of great concern. Even taken as an additional, sub-
jective metric against which to judge an applicant, there remained a 
deep sense of unease in KFOR over using this information. In fact, 
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where these reports were referred to, the recommendations made on 
the reports were often ignored by the board members so even those 
with adverse comments were still selected. 
 
Finally, one contentious issue that was never factored into the selec-
tion criteria until the process began was clan balance. The “NATO 
Standards” methodology did not take into account the influence of 
clans and their geographical displacement throughout Kosovo. This 
only came to light during the later selection events. It was rightly 
noted that on occasions there was a lack of representation from one PZ 
or another, especially across certain specialisations. This led to selec-
tion boards making compromises and choosing personnel because of 
where they lived rather than based on their performance at the tests. 
On the face of it, this approach was completely at odds with the 
NATO standards philosophy; but getting an unbalanced organisation 
from the beginning could have led to bigger problems later. The selec-
tion boards where these issues were raised always found an acceptable 
solution. This may have been at the cost of the selection procedure’s 
integrity, but it provided the balance needed in the short term. Fortu-
nately this only occurred in a few instances but the lesson should be 
learned that socio-political factors, involving complex clan, sub clan 
and family relationships, can not be ignored when planning challeng-
ing transitions. 

Political intervention 
After ten years operating in Kosovo, the NATO force should have 
known the psyche of the Kosovo Albanians. A complex web of rela-
tionships existed between those personnel who had served in the 
KLA, those who transferred into the KPC and then politics and those 
who were now hoping to join the KSF. The KLA’s legacy is at the 
heart of this chapter. As the UK Liaison Officer it had been clear that 
understanding the rivalries amongst the current and former leaders in 
the KPC was vital to understanding the context of the planned transi-
tion. The author developed relationships over time between some of 
the key personnel on the periphery of the process. During one conver-
sation, a former commander of the KPC made the point to the author 
that the Prime Minister would never accept the current commander of 
the KPC, Lieutenant General Selimi, as the new leader of the KSF. 
This opinion was based on experience dating back to the war in 1999. 
This information was passed to the KFOR Command group. 
 
On 7 November 2008 a selection board was convened, with high level 
representation from KFOR, the Kosovan Government and independ-
ent observers, in order to select the first KSF Commander. It had been 
decided that to be eligible for the post of Commander KSF, the candi-
date had to be a 2* or a 3* officer currently serving in the KPC. In es-
sence, this drew the race down to two people; the current commander 
of the KPC and his deputy, Major General Rama. The knowledge that 
one of two men was going to be selected did have a negative effect on 
the KPC leadership; but only amongst the close “followers” in each 
camp. The relationship between Selimi and Rama was sometimes dif-
ficult but they both understood what the prize was, a new force and a 
new start, and they were willing to put aside any personal differences 
in order to achieve it. However, that did not translate elsewhere and 
the debate over which officer should be selected was long and divi-
sive. 
 
After reaching a decision and according to the Kosovo Constitution, 
the nominee had to be recommended by the Government and then ap-
pointed by the President20. This was expected by the IC (and KFOR) 
to take a few days, a week at most, so that the new commander could 
then take his place on subsequent selection boards scheduled in the 
                                                 
20  Article 126 of Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo at:  
http://www.uni-graz.at/opv1www_constitution_kosovo.pdf 
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following weeks. It would also have other very positive benefits for 
the creation of the new force and the de-activation of the KPC. 
 
The widely expected result was that Lieutenant General Selimi would 
be selected. Even before the board had sat, the KPC leadership had 
accepted this outcome and had reacted positively to the prospect. 
There were some serious issues that needed to be resolved which re-
quired the KSF commander designate to step away from KPC issues 
and begin to shape the KSF’s needs through liaison with MCAD. This 
included understanding future manning structures, establishing a net-
work of KFOR mentors to work alongside KSF personnel from day 
one, and identifying broader support to the KSF when it finally started 
as a new organisation. These were just a few of the many arrange-
ments that had to be considered. The idea that General Selimi would 
start to look forward with KFOR over KSF issues while General 
Rama would de-activate the KPC was a natural and obvious division 
of responsibility, which played to their strengths. 
 
The board’s recommendation was sent to the Prime Minister’s office 
for his confirmation, on behalf of the Government, before being 
passed to the President. The chosen candidate widely reported in the 
newspapers over the following days was Lieutenant General Selimi. 
After one week it was clear that something was not right and enquiries 
were made, unofficially, to ascertain what was holding up the an-
nouncement. When the fact emerged that the paperwork still sat with 
the Prime Minister, the earlier warning that he would not want to see 
Selimi as the first head of the KSF appeared prescient. The conse-
quences of a delay to the sequencing of selections were high. Whilst 
discreet lobbying was carried out by most of the leading organisations 
with an interest in getting the appointment endorsed, using diplomatic 
and political channels, there was silence from KFOR. By the second 
week a senior KFOR officer was asked why nothing was being done 
to try to get a decision made one way or the other, to which the re-
sponse was; “it is not our job to interfere with this matter”. This was a 
curious reaction to a situation that KFOR could, and arguably should, 
have been better prepared for. The first paper made this point clearly 
by quoting from the Status Settlement, 
 
“In fulfilling the IMP's [KFOR’s] responsibilities, the Head of 
the IMP [KFOR] shall have the authority, without interference 
or permission, to do all that he/she judges necessary and 
proper… to carry out its responsibilities.” 21 
 
                                                 
21  Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Annex 11, Article 2.1, 26 
March 2007  
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By the beginning of the third week it was clear that time had run out 
to meet the original deadlines. Despite a concerted effort by the IC, 
including KFOR who finally engaged with the Government, there re-
mained a complete impasse; the taut timelines could not cope with this 
level of inactivity. The SOSAB, due on the 24 November, was post-
poned. A key member of the SOSAB was the designated KSF Com-
mander. Although the process could have continued without General 
Selimi, his knowledge of the people would have been missed and 
there would inevitably have been presentational issues; this was not an 
ideal combination. However KFOR could have carried on without his 
appointment being ratified. 
 
Finally, an emergency meeting of all key stakeholders was held on 3 
December 2008. In the absence of any firm leadership from KFOR, 
the KPC Coordinator suggested that the original date for the estab-
lishment of the KSF would have to slip to the right; a “bold adjust-
ment” was the phrase used. The meeting concluded that the 5 January 
2009 date was no longer viable and a new date of 21 January 2009 
was set, although this was not initially made public. The delay was 
announced through the KPC, to much derision by the media. The or-
ganisation that was at the heart of the planning, MCAD, and the KPC, 
drew a collective breath and started changing plans. 
 
The Prime Minister’s indecision was deeply unpopular with the KPC 
Command Group. The plan to split responsibilities between the deputy 
and the commander of the KPC, as previously described, was never 
able to happen. The KSF focus that was so urgently needed by the 
designated commander was absent. With it went every opportunity for 
him to engage with MCAD and be a part of the final planning team. 
The effect on those hoping to be selected for the KSF was also pro-
found; while everyone was waiting for a decision by the Prime Minis-
ter, morale dipped significantly. Days went by without any sense of 
direction or purpose. But still locations were closing, equipment was 
moving and for many there was literally nothing left to do. The hiatus, 
created by the delay, was the last thing the process needed. Resent-
ment grew and rumours of why the process had been held up fuelled 
the animosity towards the Government and even KFOR. 
 
The lobbying continued from all quarters until eventually it became 
clear that the Prime Minister would only act when it suited his pur-
poses. For many in the international community it was mystifying; 
why would the Prime Minister delay the stand up of the KSF, poten-
tially undermining months of work by NATO? Time dragged on with-
out a decision; the announcement of the KSF Commander was ru-
moured to be just round the corner but never seemed to arrive. By the 
5th week many staff officers in the MCAD were departing for pre-
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planned Christmas leave. The whole transition had ground to a halt 
without any solid dates on which to re-plan the selection boards and 
prepare for the delayed A Day on 21 January 2009 (assuming this date 
could be met). Crucially, senior planners also began to take their 
leave. The MCAD was becoming light on manpower because, when 
the leave plot was originally agreed, the selection process should have 
been complete. 
 
Finally on 19 December, 6 weeks after receiving the nomination, the 
news filtered through that the Prime Minister had finally endorsed the 
original name given to him. Within a day the President had ratified the 
candidate and the first commander of the KSF was announced as 
Lieutenant General Selimi. However, so much time had been lost dur-
ing this intervention that the risks to the process failing for a range of 
reasons had increased. As most KFOR personnel went home to cele-
brate Christmas, the selection process was back on track but without 
the horsepower to do that much about it, at least in the short term. 
However, the alternate date for A Day, 21 January 2009, was back in 
play, giving the MCAD an almost impossible target date to meet. Why 
COM KFOR remained fixed on this date rather than giving his staff 
some breathing space remains unclear. 
 
The lessons from this episode are many; the need to have a deep un-
derstanding of the people involved in the process of transition is cru-
cial but it is clear that KFOR came up short; perhaps the steady 
changeover of key positions in KFOR every 6 or 12 months did not 
allow this level of understanding to ever take root. The ability to sec-
ond guess local actions and to prevent the situation that faced MCAD 
and KFOR only comes from having a trusted relationship with the key 
players. The political and military (Pol/Mil) relationship can not be 
divorced over these issues and the paper makes it quite clear that 
KFOR had a responsibility to take the lead during the intervention. 
Pol/Mil activity is closely interlinked and underpins success. The need 
to recognise this mutual relationship as part of a complicated security 
transition is at the heart of current multinational doctrine.22 
                                                 
22  Published by the UK MOD; Executive Summary, JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 6/10 
SECURITY TRANSITIONS (JDN 6/10), dated November 2010. The document was de-
veloped through the Multinational Experiment 6 process:  
http://www.jfcom.mil/about/experiments/mne6.html 
Announcement day 
Events moved very quickly once the Commander’s position had been 
confirmed by the President. Immediately after receiving news that 
Lieutenant General Selimi had been appointed, the date for the 
SOSAB was announced for a few days later. Even though important 
advisors were absent from proceedings (including the vetting expert), 
the board went ahead. The overwhelming need to press on with selec-
tions to meet the 21 January 09 deadline was self evident. These cir-
cumstances put considerable pressure on MCAD who had to pull out 
all the relevant information on candidates and formally convene the 
selection boards, initially without the full complement of personnel 
available. The political intervention resulted in many of the original 
team being replaced at a critical time just as the entire plan needed to 
be reviewed and re-aligned. 
 
Obviously the effect on the corporate knowledge was significant and 
in MCAD this had a profound impact on the detailed staff work that 
was required to ensure the selections and the announcement procedure 
were conducted without error. It was clear even at this stage that the 
administration in MCAD that underpinned the whole process was un-
der stress because of this loss of expertise, even though the standard 
induction and training packages were provided. The time pressure on 
the new team was significant to get up to speed. However, one factor 
only became critical after the process had been delayed. The single 
database that held all the candidates’ information had been designed 
by an officer who had ended his tour of duty. When he departed Kos-
ovo before Christmas, he took with him the knowledge that had made 
the database such a valuable tool. With the pressure mounting during 
and after the Christmas period, the MCAD team found that the data-
base was potentially their weak link. 
 
Earlier in the planning it had also been decided that all senior officers 
and those personnel filling sensitive positions in the new force would 
be vetted by a NATO team that had been established in KFOR HQ 
from early in 2008. The reports from the vetting team would then be 
taken into account when conducting the selection procedures at the 
SOSAB and subsequent boards where appropriate. The absence of the 
vetting expert on the SOSAB created many problems later on. 
 
There was another key issue that became important. The construction 
of most military organisations is similar in shape to a pyramid. In 
other words there are more junior ranks at the bottom. In the KPC, the 
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shape had transformed over time as a way to get around the poor sala-
ries paid to the lowest ranks. The pyramid was therefore inverted. 
Consequently the middle ranking officers faced the highest chance of 
being unselected; two out of three Majors would not get into the KSF 
and the future for Lieutenant Colonels was similarly bleak. Some in-
dividuals would be offered the opportunity to drop in rank by two 
grades as a maximum to fill a post but nobody would be promoted 
unless the needs of the service dictated otherwise. The likelihood that 
there would be a large number of disaffected middle ranking officers, 
unhappy at their exclusion and critical of the process, was always go-
ing to be a problem. The only mitigation against this was a well 
funded resettlement programme run by the UNDP and pension provi-
sion for qualifying personnel by the Government of Kosovo (GoK). 
 
In order to deliver the individual envelopes to the 2800+ KPC person-
nel on A Day the decision had been taken to use KPC/KSF locations. 
The idea was simple. Supported by KFOR troops providing security 
(for KFOR personnel) members of MCAD would set up a series of 
reception centres across the country. Each KPC unit had been given a 
time window and a location in which to report and individually sign 
for their envelopes. Envelopes would have two different sets of infor-
mation; for the successful candidates it would indicate the appoint-
ment they had been assigned and other relevant information about 
where and when to parade the following day. Unsuccessful candidates 
would be given information on resettlement and pension rights as ap-
propriate. Every envelope was unique and therefore a high degree of 
accuracy was needed. However, the combination of the political inter-
vention, the 6 week delay, the changeover of personnel in MCAD and 
a complex single database conspired against this outcome. What no-
body could have anticipated was the impact these subsequent errors 
would have, compounded by the absence of an effective communica-
tions plan. 
 
As mentioned, a small force was required to guard the future KSF bar-
racks in the few days leading up to A Day and during the day itself. 
The solution was found by identifying a group of logistics personnel 
who would be “pre-selected” – although not given an envelope with 
news of their application - and issued with KSF uniforms the weekend 
before. The fact that these individuals, of all ranks, had been brought 
together in relative secrecy on a Saturday morning to be given these 
instructions reflected the extreme sensitivity over the scheduled an-
nouncements. The logistics personnel were joined by a group of senior 
officers who had also been informed that they had been pre-selected to 
ensure a degree of command and control when the KSF personnel re-
ported for duty the day after A Day. 
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On the morning of 21 January 2009 the boxes of envelopes were dis-
tributed and the MCAD teams departed across the country. Although 
all KPC personnel had been designated a location at which to learn 
their fate, the logistics personnel were not included because they were 
guarding the KPC/KSF locations. Therefore each of the logistics per-
sonnel were personally hand delivered their envelopes before the main 
event began later. At ten o clock in the morning across the country, 
the first queues of hopeful KPC personnel lined up to discover 
whether they would have a new career in the KSF. It was the culmina-
tion of months of hard work by MCAD and the result of some highly 
detailed planning by its staff. To the watching world, the KSF looked 
ready to take its first few nascent steps. 
 
The first signs that things had not gone well soon began to emerge. 
 
By Midday on A Day the first rumours surfaced of problems over the 
selection of individuals. A female had been selected even though she 
had a prosthetic limb. The only other KPC female in her unit had been 
unsuccessful. Elsewhere, two Lieutenant Colonels arrived at the 
Training and Doctrine Command reception centre and opened their 
envelopes to discover that they had both been selected to command 
the same Battalion. The KSF was only structured for three Battalions 
in total. Another example that did not have the impact but was a 
deeply personal blow involved one of the “pre-selected” logisticians. 
When he had opened his envelope he discovered that he had not been 
invited to join the KSF. He immediately assumed there had been a 
mistake. When he arrived for work the next day in the newly titled 
Land Forces Headquarters he was told the news he did not want to 
hear. He had not been selected, there had been a mistake and he was 
required to hand in his newly issued KSF uniform. There was even a 
lorry driver living in Germany who was selected for the new force; on 
closer investigation it transpired that he had travelled to Kosovo to 
undergo testing and then returned to Germany. As mentioned earlier 
in the paper, the assumption existed that information supplied by the 
KPC G1 (personnel) department was accurate. In hindsight, this had 
been an error. There were more examples of mistakes, some more se-
rious than others but they combined to undermine the selection proce-
dure and to give those who had not been selected ammunition with 
which to complain. The fact that only a modest number of envelopes 
contained inaccurate information was the not the problem in itself. 
Some argued that such a small number of mistakes was within a rea-
sonable margin of error; that out of the 2800+ letters that had been 
produced, less than twenty mistakes was a fair return under the cir-
cumstances. However, the errors confirmed the impression by many 
observers that the selection procedure was flawed. 
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One of the key attributes of a successful transition is the legitimacy 
with which the process is conducted. By the end of the A Day more 
and more stories were emerging about mistakes, which put a strain on 
this legitimacy. The MCAD staff officers were approached with re-
quests to reconsider decisions that had been made. Senior KSF Com-
manders lobbied KFOR officers to remove or reinstate individuals. In 
some cases there was very good reason. For example, the KPC’s Ur-
ban Search and Rescue capability had qualified to lead international 
missions following a period of training provided by the UK Fire Ser-
vice charity, Operation Florian.23 The de-mining unit had also earned a 
very good reputation by assisting KFOR in de-mining tasks since 
1999 as well as in Albania by assisting in the aftermath of the Gerdec 
ammunition explosion in March 2008. The objective nature of the se-
lection procedure counted against many of these specialists, who were 
not selected on fitness or medical grounds. An important capability 
was effectively removed over night and the KSF’s vision of quickly 
deploying on international operations was set back years.24 Only the 
timely intervention by senior officials within the IC ensured that a 
waiver was applied in the cases of some of those affected, which par-
tially saved the capability. 
 
                                                 
23  Operation Florian was established as a charity in 1995 (Charity Number 1054657). It is a 
UK Fire Service Humanitarian Charity working to promote the protection of life amongst 
communities in need, world wide, by the provision of equipment and training to improve 
fire fighting and rescue capabilities; http://www.operationflorian.com/kosovo.htm  
24  The KSF is to be a flexible force with no territorial affiliation. Personnel may be required 
to serve anywhere within the territory of the Republic of Kosovo and may be deployed 
abroad on operations in accordance with Article 2 of the Law on the Kosovo Security 
Force;  
http://mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Law%20on%20Service%20in%20the%20KSF.pdf 
Post announcement day reaction 
To unselected personnel, good people had been excluded at the ex-
pense of others who should not have been selected for the new force. 
The lack of a coherent and proactive communications plan that should 
have provided more objective and transparent reporting for the media 
was coming back to bite KFOR as rumours spread that the KSF 
Commander had hand picked individuals. Perceptions amongst the 
wider KPC membership and even from observers outside the organi-
sation were changing. There were a growing number of isolated inci-
dents which, put together, provided a picture that was beginning to 
play into the hands of those critics who said that the selection process 
was poorly executed. 
 
The effect of the media coverage in the days that followed A Day and 
the stories that circulated widely had a very negative impact. Some 
senior KSF personnel decided that the process had been tainted be-
yond repair and resigned. The shock of losing some senior officers 
was followed by the disappointment of losing others in middle ranking 
positions. 
 
Emerging doctrine on security transitions includes a very clear re-
quirement for mentoring and evaluation support to be in place from 
day one. This issue had been raised well in advance of the establish-
ment of the KSF but despite some isolated work having been com-
pleted in MCAD, there were no plans in place for the KSF’s first day 
of operation. Without a KSF Commander (designate) there was no-
body to push this issue. The absence of this essential mechanism was 
compounded by the allocation of personnel to appointments. The 
complicated selection process, taken together with KPC applicants’ 
job preferences, resulted in many staff officers filling positions for 
which they had no experience; some were appointed to key positions 
in Land Forces Headquarters with no idea what to do. The feeling 
amongst the newly selected KSF officers was of abandonment be-
cause of the absence of any mentoring plan. In the days following A 
Day this point was made many times. Inefficiency, a significant loss 
of momentum, disillusionment and an inability by the KSF leadership 
to impose much order was the result. 
 
Outside the new force many of those who had not been selected were 
unhappy. Perhaps their feelings would not have been so pronounced 
had there been fewer high profile mistakes. However, the situation 
began to take on a life of its own. Within a few days there were pro-
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tests by unselected personnel on the streets of Pristina in front of the 
Government building. Demands to talk to the Minister for the KSF 
quickly led to a meeting with representatives of the protesters who by 
this point were highly organised. After the first meeting there were 
calls to meet the Prime Minister, which then took place. Finally the 
Prime Minister, the KFOR Commander and the KSF Commander met 
to discuss the matter. Shortly afterwards, and without reference to his 
staff officers in KFOR HQ (or indeed in MCAD), the KFOR Com-
mander announced that all eligible unselected personnel would be in-
vited back into the process in order to attend the initial training 
courses that were already organised by the NATO Training Team for 
selected KSF personnel. The news was a bombshell. The philosophy 
of the initial training course had always been to “train in” personnel 
into the KSF; i.e. the idea was not to fail candidates. However, the an-
nouncement ensured that in order to control numbers entering the KSF 
the NATO Training Team would have to change this approach by 
“training out” individuals. 
 
The plan had to be amended in order to schedule more courses and the 
length of time allocated to training had to be extended to cater for the 
additional numbers. And without an appeals procedure in place, those 
who were still not invited back were left to conclude that they had 
failed their medical (if they had taken one), leading to anger and frus-
tration because they were unable to discover why they had “failed”. 
The International Civilian Office was especially concerned that their 
role as observers had been damaged by the decision to invite those 
unselected back into the selection “pot”, as they had signed off the 
original process. Even the UNDP team implementing the KPC reset-
tlement programme had to re-calculate its planned activity because of 
a drop in numbers of unselected personnel entering the KPC resettle-
ment scheme. The staff officers in MCAD were also faced with hav-
ing to reverse engineer the selection process in the light of the new 
direction. 
 
The decision by COM KFOR to reinstate the unselected KPC person-
nel effectively implied that the original selection procedure was 
flawed. KFOR could have chosen to ignore the protesters and contin-
ued as planned. The Kosovo politicians who had sat through the selec-
tion process could have reiterated the fairness of the process. But none 
of this happened. Instead, a political compromise was agreed without 
any reference to the international observers, MCAD staff and newly 
selected KSF personnel. 
Lessons identified 
Identifying lessons from which to learn is crucial for organisations to 
improve and evolve. This applies strongly to the transition from the 
KPC to the KSF; and whilst some situations are common to both ac-
tivities this chapter will look at the specifics included in this paper. 
 
The standing up of the KSF generated a number of lessons that are 
summarised here: firstly, the clear imperative to spend time under-
standing the socio-political environment and the influence of ancient 
clan structures and traditions on local actors, who are central to the 
transition; secondly, the need to produce a comprehensive communi-
cations plan to support the other lines of operation during such a com-
plicated activity as a security transition and to have the confidence to 
be transparent with the media; thirdly, the fundamental need to under-
stand the role of the organisation responsible for the transition, to be 
flexible and to be proactive; and finally the requirement for strong 
leadership and a determination to achieve the end state with the ap-
propriate local ownership throughout the process. 
 
The context of this transition could not have been more complicated, 
dominated as it was by disagreements over recognition and legitimacy 
not only within the IC but also within the very organisation charged 
with “supervising and supporting” the stand up of the KSF. It is also 
worth including the fact that Kosovo had been governed by the United 
Nations between 1999 and 2007; it had had its security delivered by 
KFOR constantly for 9 years. And even though Kosovo had unilater-
ally declared independence, it was still dependent on the IC to provide 
support, advice and leadership in order to gain the confidence to act as 
an independent country. Its dependence on KFOR (and by default 
NATO) over the establishment of the KSF was unavoidable and this 
led to a relationship that was heavily (and necessarily) one-sided. But 
this did not prevent Kosovan politics from stamping its mark on the 
process, however unwelcome its presence was. The situations that 
have been included in the paper and used as lessons to be learned 
should be considered in this context. 
 
Taking each lesson in turn, it is clear from this paper that there was an 
absence of cultural understanding and awareness at different levels 
within KFOR. As noted in the first paper, this was a surprising out-
come, considering how long KFOR had spent in Kosovo. The applica-
tion of a “western” approach did not always sit comfortably with real-
ity in Kosovo, even if these were the standards to which Kosovo as-
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pired. Equally, the comment that influencing the Prime Minister was 
beyond the role of the military was evidence of KFOR’s unwillingness 
to risk its relationship with the GoK even though it had the authority 
to continue with the process regardless. The lack of recognition of the 
importance of the clan system and the geographical spread of each 
clan would ideally have been taken into account when considering the 
best approach to selecting KSF personnel. Leaving some PZs without 
any significant representation was never going to be accepted by the 
KSF leadership and it was no surprise that this point was raised during 
selections. The need for compromise by KFOR at the beginning to 
ensure the KSF had the basic framework against which to develop 
would, over time, be replaced by a more objective and appropriate ap-
proach to selection and recruiting. This is a strong lesson to apply in 
other similar situations where clan balance is culturally important. 
 
The absence of a communications plan and associated narrative was 
an omission. The KPC Information Operations plan was too little too 
late and it is questionable whether the KPC should have had anything 
to do with the KSF communications plan, especially when NATO was 
so keen to de-link the two organisations. Time and again the lack of 
any proactive campaign allowed the Kosovan national media to run 
stories which often fuelled the lack of understanding of the process 
held by many in the KPC and elsewhere. The unique status of Kosovo, 
and NATO’s policy of adopting a reactionary stance, was largely re-
sponsible for this. The reliance on the KPC to discuss KSF matters 
was unrealistic and did not improve understanding of the KSF process 
by the media. As an example, it was only towards the end of the RSS 
implementation, during the final days of selection at Ferizaj, that a 
journalist asked to visit the selection tests in order to write an article 
on what was happening. Although it could be argued that if others had 
requested this access earlier it would have been granted, the fact that 
KFOR waited to be approached over such an important activity 
showed the organisation to be constrained by politics at the expense of 
fulfilling the mission as efficiently as possible. 
 
The third lesson focuses on the role of KFOR in the stand up of the 
KSF. KFOR’s role was quite clear, but there was a widely held view 
that some inside the organisation wanted to remain at arms length 
from the whole idea of establishing the Kosovo Security Force (or a 
Kosovo security force as it was often referred within KFOR, reflecting 
the lack of recognition of the GoK with the NATO force). The fact 
that the NATO Advisory Team contributed to the stand up of the KSF, 
for example through the provision of its regulations, demonstrated that 
KFOR had a lack of capacity or political will to do the work itself. 
There were times when a comprehensive approach to the problem and 
taking the initiative would have brought better results. The debacle 
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over the Prime Minister’s intervention cried out for firm leadership. 
The example cited in the paper referred to the need for an effective 
military and political relationship which could have avoided many of 
the issues that occurred during this period. In addition to taking a 
more robust and forward-leaning approach, the balance between meet-
ing strategic deadlines and remaining flexible seemed to have been 
lost. Once the reality dawned that the process was in trouble, moving 
selections and the subsequent start date for the KSF to the right was 
sensible. However, there appeared to be an unhelpful rush to meet the 
second date on 21 January 2009. As the paper made clear, the pressure 
of a new team and the short deadlines generated many unintended 
consequences. The absence of any mentoring for the KSF in the days 
and weeks that followed its launch is a further example of an inconsis-
tent approach. Emerging doctrine addresses this point, as mentioned in 
the paper, but it should have been obvious that this need was vital to 
get the new force operating efficiently and with purpose. 
 

Conclusion 
The story of how the KSF eventually stood up, linked as it was with 
the de-activation of the KPC, remains a triumph for a very small num-
ber of people who applied their collective experience and positive ap-
proach to ensuring that the KSF began its life in the best possible 
shape. They faced many hurdles along the way and tight timelines 
created a high pressure environment from the beginning. The tenacity 
of many of the officers in MCAD, together with a practical and deci-
sive role played by the senior leadership in the IC and the KSF before 
and after stand up, ensured that most difficulties were overcome. As 
the paper describes, there were some issues that even well trained staff 
officers were unable to solve. The need for leadership and direction 
was not always present when it was needed most and this often made 
matters more difficult than they needed to be. Low level solutions and 
“work-arounds”, without recourse to the chain of command, featured 
strongly. A pragmatic approach to this transition was the only option. 
The scale of the achievement on A Day reflected the work that the 
MCAD put in to keep the KSF on track. That the process was delayed 
without timely pressure from KFOR will probably be put down to a 
lack of cultural understanding and a fear of jeopardising the safe and 
secure environment that the 16,000 strong KFOR maintained. The les-
sons learned chapter illuminates these issues. 
 
The paper has attempted to provide a unique view of events that led to 
the establishment of the KSF over the winter of 2008/09 in Kosovo. 
The paper has artificially narrowed its scope to concentrate on the key 
issues directly involved in the MCAD plan to stand up the force and 
has only included references to other activity in passing. It is worth 
remembering that during the period described here there were many 
other events taking place, not least the de-activation of the KPC which 
impacted directly on the people who were central to the KSF’s imme-
diate future. The inclusion of real life examples was intended to pro-
vide the reader with a deeper understanding of what happened, to rec-
ognise areas of best practice and to observe where mistakes were 
made. 
 
As noted at the start of the paper, the paper was not written to criticise 
any organisation or to question the conduct of individuals. It was de-
signed to give the reader a picture of the difficulties faced by KFOR 
and NATO during the transition between the KPC and the KSF. As 
the paper has highlighted, a well worked plan even with the bare 
minimum of resources can be de-railed by the most unexpected of 
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sources. The need therefore to conduct a thorough evaluation of the 
problem initially, the need to have total commitment from all stake-
holders involved in the project, and the need to understand the people 
at the heart of the transition is self evident. 
 
The arrival of relevant multinational doctrine for a security transition 
of this type is timely and should be of great assistance to future mili-
tary and civilian planners when conducting this activity in a country 
emerging from conflict. The case of Kosovo, struggling to gain recog-
nition and legitimacy on the international stage,25 ensured that the se-
curity transition was going to have an added dimension of complexity. 
That the KSF has since reached Initial Operating Capability is testa-
ment to the individuals within the organisation, the KSF leadership in 
particular, who remained focused on the prize of a functioning KSF. 
 
And what was the result? The youngest security organisation in the 
Balkans, the Kosovo Security Force, is now firmly established and 
will take its rightful place at the heart of Kosovo’s fledgling status as a 
member of the international community. 
                                                 
25  The International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion on 22 July 2010, by a 
vote of 10 to 4 that; "the declaration of independence of the 17th of February 2008 did not 
violate general international law."  
